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THE EMERGENCE OF ART LAW
JAMES J. FISHMAN *
L EGAL CHANGE MOST OFTEN MIRRORS society's broader social, political, and
economic developments.' As society becomes more complex the law
evolves to meet additional needs, often by becoming more specialized. In
recent years the consumer, environmental, and welfare movements, as well as
the demands of the poor and disadvantaged for civil and economic rights,
have led to changes in the law and to the development of new legal specialties.
One area of the law which has most recently become sufficiently particular-
ized to be considered a discrete legal specialty is art law.
By art law we refer to the practices of traditional legal specialties such as
commercial law, contracts, copyright, entertainment, international law, labor
relations, and tax law as they have evolved to meet the ever more particular
needs of the visual artist. Traditionally, a work of art has been treated as any
other chattel. As Franklin Feldman and Stephen E. Weil, authors of a leading
reference work on visual art law, have noted:
A generation ago, most of the problems involving art works were
resolved by recourse to some generalized body of law. The rules
regulating the sale of an etching by Picasso were largely the same as
those covering a sack of potatoes by a farmer. A museum might
dispose of a painting from its collection with as little question as a
hospital selling a used bed.2
Today, American law relating to the arts has become more particular, and
art law itself has developed into a discrete and increasingly recognized legal
field. The Association of American Law Schools, for example, has created a
section on art law. The American Law Institute presents yearly seminars in
one aspect of art law, "Legal Problems of Museum Operations," which in the
past year drew over 200 participants. A small but growing number of
attorneys have specialized their practice in this area, and an increasing
number of law schools, including Fordham, Harvard, Lewis and Clark,
Stanford and Pace, are offering courses on art law. There are two case books
on art law presently available and a third is expected in the next few months.3
The New York Law Journal, the daily paper of the New York legal
community, publishes a bimonthly column on the topic, and law reviews have
begun to present symposia.4
* A.B., A.M., Univ. of Pennsylvania; J.D. New York Univ.; Associate Professor of Law. Pace
University School of Law.
I J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 295-301 (1950); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 584-91 (1973).
2 S. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, ART WORKS: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE 5 (1974).
3 S. FELDMAN and S. WEIL, supra note 2; L. DuBoFF, DESKBOOK OF ART LAw (1977). A third
casebook, LAW, ETHICS & THE VISUAL ARTS, has been prepared by Professors Albert Elsen and
John H. Merryman of Stanford University and will be published by Matthew Bender.
4 In addition to this symposium, see Elsen, Introduction: Why Do We Care About Art, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 951 (1976); Symposium - Legal Aspects of the International Traffic in Stolen Art, 4
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It is the purpose of this Article to examine the practical and legal origins of
the field of art law, and to highlight principal legal questions which are of
significant concern to the visual artist.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF ART LAW AS A DISCRETE SPECIALTY
The major factor in the development of art law has been the art explosion
and cultural boom of the past twenty years. In the post-World War Two
period, the art and auction markets shifted from Europe to the United States.
Concomitant with this economic shift, new currents in art such as the
development of abstract expressionism, pop art, and other visual arts move-
ments arose on this side of the Atlantic.5 New York's pre-eminence as the art
market's center led to an increased interest in the arts and to coverage of art by
the media. Despite somewhat sanctimonious protests of artists and others,
art became in many ways more like other businesses - big business - and the
marketing of Andy Warhol's Campbell Soup Can and other works became
not that much different from the marketing of Campbell's soup. Art became
an important commodity followed even by non-collectors, and auctions
became chic events followed closely by the press and the public.
6
A. The New Collectors
New patterns of collecting and art appreciation emerged in this period,
and the interest of Americans in the arts crossed all cultural, political, social,
and economic boundaries. The acceptance of the visual arts into the cultural
mainstream is demonstrated in the corporate interest and support of modern
art and architecture. In the past decade there has been a tremendous
expansion in the number of museums, galleries, and collectors. The expan-
sion of art collecting into the middle class was encouraged by the creation of
new collecting art forms such as prints, posters, and photographs.7 This not
only greatly increased the dollar value of the art industry, but widened the
possibilities of consumer abuse.
8
B. Federal Funding of the Arts
The intrusion of state and federal governments into the funding of the arts
has been another important factor in the development of art law.9 Govern-
mental funding has been followed closely by governmental regulation, which
in turn has had a great effect upon the emergence of legal procedures and
regulations in the arts and upon the ways in which arts organizations do
5 For an interesting discussion of the art explosion in the United States in the last twenty years,
see Warshaw, But Is It Art? The Artist In the Market, ART & THE LAw, Feb.-Mar. 1975, at 1.
6 The 1973 sale at Southeby Park Bernet of Postwar and Contemporary Printings and
Sculpture from the Collection of Robert C. Scull brought national media coverage and was made
the subject of a movie, America's Pop Collector Robert C. Scull - Contemporary Art at Auction,
produced by E. J. Vaughn in 1974.
7 Warshaw, supra note 5, at 3.
8 See notes 30-37 infra.
9 The funding of the National Endowment for the Arts has grown from $2,534,308 in 1966 to
$123,500,000 in 1977-1978.
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business. Fifty years ago the major responsibility of museum counsel was to
insure that elderly patrons had made appropriate bequest provisions to the
museum. Now, museum counsel are faced with a variety of legal problems
similar to those of other complex institutions which receive federal and state
funds.' 0
The infusion of government funding has created a variety of problems and
forced reactions to federal regulations. Because of the amount of federal and
state support, many museums can no longer be considered private institu-
tions, but have become quasi-public; as a result, the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Federal Constitution may be deemed to apply to
everything from hiring policies to exhibitions." The governmental presence,
has forced museums to become aware of a variety of federally required
programs for the handicapped, 12 for employment,
3 and for minorities.14
Trustees and curators have been forced to define their responsibilities, and
public officers such as attorneys general are becoming more concerned with
the activities of so-called private institutions with self-perpetuating boards.' 5
Related to this are demands for accountability of museums to the public.
The legal complexities of museum operations have led to the creation of
legal offices in many of the larger museums, and to the placement of lawyers in
other institutions under less threatening titles such as "administrator."
C. The Visual Art and the Law
The artist, too, has been affected economically, politically, and socially by
the changing status of the arts. As Robert Warshaw has noted, even more
striking than the increase in the number of artists in America and the
movement of the art-world center to the United States was the transformation
which took place in the artist's socio-economic status. Arshile Gorky, Jackson
Pollock, Willem de Kooning, Mark Rothko, and Adolph Gottlieb had all been
on the rolls of the WPA's federal art project in the mid-1930's, receiving an
average salary of ninety-five dollars per month. During the 1940's Rothko,
Gottlieb, Barnett Newman, and Morris Louis were each supported by their
working wives.'
During the 1960's and 1970's the artist became a cultural hero. Andy
Warhol and Jamie Wyeth are members of cafe society. Jasper Johns and
"0 See ALI-ABA, LEGAL AsPEaCrs OF MUSEUM OPERATIONS (1977).
1 Malaro, Conduct of Museums Which May Infringe Constitutional Rights, in ALI-ABA,
LEGAL AsPEcTs OF MUSEUM OPERATIONS 367, 370 (1977); Ward, Sources For and Applicability of
Constitutional Limitations on Museum's Freedom of Action, in ALI-ABA, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
MUSEUM OPERATIONS 379 (1977).
12 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975).
13 Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1) (Supp. V 1975); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. § 621 (1970).
1' Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970); Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V 1975).
15 Lefkowitz v. Museum of the American Indian Heye Foundation, No. 41416175 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1977). Weintraub, Museums with Walls: Public Regulation of Deaccessioning and Disposal,
ART & THE LAW, Feb.-Mar. 1975, at 1; H. HESS, THE GRAND AcQuiSrrORs (1974).
16 Warshaw, supra note 5.
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Robert Rauschenberg have lunched with Mrs. Mondale. 17 The American
artist is no longer an outcast. He has been incorported into mass society as a
creator of consumer goods, with a new-found social status equal to that of a
rock star or investment banker."'
This new social and economic status has thrust the artist into a business
environment which differs greatly from the almost feudal patron relationships
of the past and the "left bank" stereotype of his lifestyle. Artists were faced
with legal problems similar to those of other businessmen. They began to
play the role of manufacturer with respect to protecting their work against
unauthorized reproduction, and the role of employee with the respect to
protecting themselves against exploitation by employers. As business peo-
ple, they shared the concerns of other affluent Americans in the areas of tax
and estate planning.
One lesson for artists from the litigation surrounding the estates of Mark
Rothko 9 and David Smith21 is the need to have competent counsel, with
experience in representing artists, in drafting one's will. The tax consequen-
ces to the artist's estate and to his art work, as well as the liabilities of his
executors, are of such magnitude that casual estate planning is an invitation to
litigation. Like investment bankers and rock stars, successful artists will
increasingly be surrounded by a specialized coterie of attorneys, accountants,
and agents.
Not every visual artist, of course, has shared in this cultural boom. The
number of individuals who call themselves "artists" is staggering; each year
the American art educational system alone graduates 30,000 individuals who
can call themselves artists. 21 The vast majority of artists have not harvested
the commercial rewards of the art boom. However, they have coalesced and
like other disadvantaged groups begun to make. demands for recognition of
artists' rights.
II. THE ORIGINS OF SPECIALIZED TREATMENT
OF ARTISTS AND WORKS OF ART
A. Early Customs Court Definitions of Art
The courts and legislatures have just begun to realize that the arts require
special legal treatment, but officials of the Customs Court have been aware of
the legal problems unique to art work since the nineteenth century. The court
has had a particularly difficult time in defining what is "art," With the result that
some fine art works have long received lower import duties than other items. 2
The court first employed a representational test, which was a most
restrictive definition of "art" for legal purposes. As a result of the representa-
tional test, the term "art" as defined by the tariff act did not cover the entire
17 See Arts and Taxes on the Menu of Mrs. Mondale's Luncheon, N.Y. TiMES, June 2,1977, at
16, col. 3.
I Warshaw, supra note 5.
19 In re Rothko, 71 Misc. 2d 74, 335 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
20 Estate of David Smith, 57 T.C. 650 (1972).
21 Hughes, A Modest Proposal: Royalties for Artists, TIME, Mar. 11, 1974, at 65.
2 See generally L. DuBon', supra note 3; Tariff Act of 1883, ch. 22, Stat. 513.
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range of the beautiful and artistic, but only those artistic productions which
could be characterized as "something more than ornamental or decorative
[and] which may be properly ranked as examples of the free fine arts, or
possibly that class only of the free fine arts imitative of natural objects as the
artist sees them and appealing to the emotions through the eye alone."
23
In a legal context this meant that a dreary portrait of a government official
was art, while a cubist painting by Picasso was not. As such, the representa-
tional test was an arbitrary and overly restrictive definition which took no
cognizance of currents of modern art. It was finally superseded in Bancusi v.
United States.24
In 1926 Edward Steichen, the photographer, purchased Bird in Space
from Constantine Brancusi in France, and brought the work to the United
States.25 The sculpture was invoiced as a bronze bird, a work of art, and
assumed by Steichen to be free of duty. The customs officials who greeted
Bird in Space considered the sculpture as an object of manufactured metal,
and therefore taxable at forty percent of its value.26 The Customs Court,
however, gave legal recognition to nonrepresentational forms of art, and held
that Bird in Space was entitled to free entry.
The significance of Brancusi for the development of art law was the
judicial recognition that the standards relating to works of art must include
special criteria which reflect the unique nature of the subject matter. The
Brancusi court recognized that the statutory definitions in the tariff act had to
bend to meet artistic developments.2 7 Nonetheless, the courts continued to
struggle with distinctions between art and non-art 2 until the 1958 amend-
ments to the tariff art29 removed substantially all barriers to the free entry of
modem and abstract art works in modern and abstract media and styles.
21 United States v. Olivetti & Co., 7 Ct. Cust. App. 46, 48-49 (1916). The court noted that a
marble font and two marble seats, although admittedly beautiful, were not art within the
meaning of the Tariff Act since they were not representations of a natural object.
24 T.D. 43063, 54 TREAS, DEC. 428 (1928).
25 The case is described in L. ADAMS, ART ON TRIAL 37 (1976).
26 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858.
27 The court in Brancusi noted that:
There has been developing a so-called new school of art, whose exponents attempt to
portray abstract ideas rather than to imitate natural objects. Whether or not we are in
sympathy with these newer ideas and the schools which represent them, we think the
fact of their existence and their influence upon the art world as recognized by the courts
must be considered.
Brancusi v. United States, T.D. 43063,54 TREAS. DEC. 428,430-31 (1928).
28 L. DuBoFF, supra note 3, at 20. Customs courts have still not recognized the artistic merit of
crafts or articles which may have a primarily utilitarian purpose, or which may be the product of
an artisan. L. DuBOFF, supra note 3, at 24. See Mayer v. United States, 18 C.C.P.A. 117 (1930)
(imported antique diamond created by artisan rather than artist subject to duty); H.W. St. John &
Co v. United States, 65 Cust. Ct. 577 (1970) (stones imported for incorporation into columns used
to support church roof not works of art). Antiques are classified as objects of the fine arts even
though they may have a utilitarian purpose or were created by artisans. 19 U.S.C. § 776.20
(1970). Nor have reproductions and copies fared very well. For sculptures only limited editions
of ten or less are entitled to free entry. 19 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970). Art works imported for
commercial use are ineligible for duty free entry. L.-DuBo , supra note 3, at 58; Whitman
Publishing Co. v. United States, 6 Cust. Ct. 65 (1941) (water color paintings conceived by British
artists for reproduction in children's book charged 15 percent duty). See generally Derenberg &
Baum, Congress Rehabilitates Modern Art, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1959).
2' Tariff Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-262, 73 Stat. 549.
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B. The Legislative Response to Art
Art law developed as the courts and legislators took cognizance that the
unique nature of the arts required special legislative and judicial treatment.
Existing regulations, practices, and statutes did not always protect the artist
or the collecting public from the customary ways of doing business in the art
world. New techniques in the reproduction of art, as well as the increase in
the number of collectors, led New York, California, and one or two other
states to redefine the property rights related to the reproduction of works of
fine art.
The Uniform Commercial Code deals generally with tangible personal
property, rather than with the significant intangible rights emanating from art
objects .30 While some have argued that the Uniform Commercial Code can be
utilized to solve the problems relating to the sale and warranty of art works,31
others have felt that the Code protection was insufficient.32 The legislatures
of New York and California have sought to protect purchasers of art works
through legislation making falsification of a certificate of authenticity of a
work of art a class A misdemeanor. 33 Dealers who furnish a written instru-
ment describing or identifying an art object with any author or authorship are
presumed under these statutes to have included that description as part of the
basis of the bargain, and to have created an express warranty with respect to
the authenticity of such authorship as of the date of exchange. Disclaimers of
warranty are limited to void unreasonable results if the work is proven to be a
counterfeit, if the work is unqualifiedly stated to be the work of a named artist,
and if it is found that as of the date of sale or exchange such statement was
false, misleading, or erroneous.3 4
California and Illinois have pioneered legislation requiring elaborate
disclosure of all informational details surrounding the sale of an edition of
"original prints."35 In 1975, New York passed legislation prohibiting decep-
tive acts in the sale of fine prints and posters.36 One commentator has criticized
the overlegislation in this area because of legislators' impressions that for any
arguable abuse, a separate law is necessary to protect the consumer.3 7
The proliferation and perfection of modem techniques in printing and
reproduction, however, may also make it easier for the unscrupulous to
defraud untrained and unsophisticated purchasers. This feeling accounts for
the current explosion in legislation protecting the collector, since the statutes
aim to increase the information given to and understood by purchasers of fine
arts.
30 S. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, supra note 2, at 287.
31 Note, Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Solutions to Art Fraud and Forgery, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 409 (1972).
32 Feldman, New Protection for the Art Collector - Warranties, Opinions and Disclaimers, 23
REc. 661 (1968).
33 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 219-i (McKinney Supp. 1976).
34 Id. § 219-d.
35 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1740-1744 (West 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 361-367 (Smith-
Hart Supp. 1977).
36 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw art. 12-H (McKinney Supp. 1976).
37 Koegal, Recent Legislation, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1977, at 1. In the 1977 session of the New
York State Legislature eight bills relating to the visual arts were introduced.
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C. The Response of the Legal Profession:
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts
Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts (VLA) began in New York in 1969 when
four young lawyers assisted a few artist friends. It has grown to a program
which provides legal assistance to over 500 different artists and arts organiza-
tions in New York City alone. The VLA concept, which provides free legal
representation by volunteer attorneys for individual artists and not-for-profit
arts organizations that are unable to afford private counsel and have arts-
related legal problems, has spread to nearly a dozen states. There are now
VLA programs in many regions and cities, including Albany, Boston, Buffalo,
Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Los Angeles, Poughkeepsie, Philadelphia, Ro-
chester, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and the states of Iowa, New Jersey,
Connecticut, and Oregon.
38
The Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts movement has influenced the devel-
opment of new trends in representation, focused upon the legal needs of
creative people. 39 As in other areas of public interest law, once the beneficiar-
ies of legal resources began to demand their legal rights the law became
increasingly responsive to their demands.
III. THE ARTIST AND His WORK
A. Artist-Dealer Relationships
Works of art are generally sold in the United States on consignment, and
most artists consign their works to a dealer. 40 Section 2-326 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, however, provides that consigned goods are subject to the
claims of the dealer's creditors unless: there is a sign-posting procedure, which
generally is not done; it is established that the dealer is known by his creditors
to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others; and the required
financing statement has been filed, which presents a substantial practical
problem.41
Unfortunately, many galleries experience financial difficulties within a
short time after opening, and are forced to declare bankruptcy. The artist is
most often in the position of a general creditor in the bankruptcy proceedings,
and may not be able to recover his paintings. In response to the resulting
hardship, statutes have been passed in New York and a few other states which
exempt the consignor-consignee relation of the artist and dealer from the
application of Section 2-326. These statutes, which clarify the inherently
fiduciary character of the artist-dealer relationship and lay the legal founda-
tion for the application of criminal sanctions, establish that the artist is to be
considered a principal and the dealer his agent.42
38 [1976] VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS ANN. REP. 6-7.
39 S. FELDMAN & S. WELL, supra note 2.
40 Id. at 495.
41 U.C.C. § 2-326(3).
42 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW art. 12-C (McKinney 1975). An equivalent California statute took
effect on Jan. 1, 1976. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1738 (West 1976).
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B. Artists' Housing
Sufficient studio space and adequate housing accommodations are among
the most pressing concerns of artists today. Often preferring an urban
environment in which adequate housing is scarce and expensive, artists have
turned to renting commercial facilities, for joint living and working space,4 3
often in violation of zoning laws relating to the use of commercial property for
residential purposes. New York has provided for the special needs of artists,
and at the same time restored a declining area of New York City, by amending
the Multiple Dwelling Law 4 4 to permit joint living and working space in the
Soho area. 45 The revitalized artistic community which has resulted from this
move suggests that similar projects may be profitably instituted in other cities.
C. Artists' Reserved Rights
The rallying cry for the artists' rights movement has been "artists' reserved
rights" - a demand by artists that they should have a reserved right in their
artwork after its initial sale, and should receive a royalty should the work
increase in value upon resale by the original purchaser.
In the United States most artists are compensated for their work through a
fee minus a dealer commission of thirty to fifty percent. Unless contractually
agreed otherwise, the artist will not receive any financial benefit should the
artwork greatly increase in value. The artists' reserved right, or droit de suite
is not a new idea. Such legislation exists in Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France,
Germany, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Tunisia, and Uruguay. 46 In January,
1977, California became the first American jurisdiction to enact the droit de
suite, mandating that artists are to receive a royalty upon the resale of their
work.
47
The demands for an American equivalent to the droit de suite can be
traced to the 1940's, but the greatest impetus came from the Scull sale at
Sotheby Parke Bernet in 1973.48 Robert Rauschenberg's "Thaw," sold to
collector Robert Scull for $900 in 1958, was subsequently resold for $85,000 at
43 VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS, HousINc FoR ARTIS: THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 1
(1976).
14 N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 276-278 (McKinney 1971).
'5 VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR Tm Amrs, HOUSING FOR ATnsrs: THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE 14-33
(1976). While the recycling of commercial buildings into residential buildings was initially for
artists alone, legislation in 1976 expanded the areas in which such conversions could take place
and permitted non-artists to reside in lofts. Id. at 13-6(a).
46 Hochfield, Artist Rights: Pros and Cons, Art News, May, 1975, at 23. In Europe, legislation
pertaining to artists' reserved rights differs with respect to the resales covered, the percentage of
the resale price that the artist obtains, the minimum price before which the reserved right
mechanism is brought into play, and the length of time during which it operates. Price & Price,
Rights of Artists: The Case of the Droit de Suite, 31 ART J. 144 (1971). See generally Price,
Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the Droit de Suite, 77 YALE L.
J. 1333 (1968).
41 CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 1977).
48 In 1940 the artist Grant Wood, angered that his painting Daughters of Revolution had
trebled in value within a few years, announced that a new work, Parson Weems Fable would be
sold with the stipulation that subsequent sales would bring him fifty percent of the appreciated
value. Hochfield, Artists Rights: Pros and Cons, Art News, May, 1975, at 20. It is not known
whether Wood carried through with his threat.
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a profit of 9,333 percent. Rauschenberg confronted Scull at the auction, and
later told the Wall Street Journal, "[f]rom now on, I want a royalty on the
resale and I am going to get it."4 9
Previously, in 1971, a New York lawyer, Robert Projansky, and a Soho
dealer, Seth Siegelaub, developed "The Artist's Reserved Rights Transfer and
Sale Agreement," 50 which was an attempt to accomplish contractually much
of what the California legislation has more recently attempted to provide.
The Projansky Agreement, as it came to be called, was a contract designed
to give the artist fifteen percent of any increase in the value of his work each
time it was transferred, facilitated by the inclusion of a record of who owned
the work at any given time. Not surprisingly, collectors were reluctant to sign
the Projansky Agreement, and almost none were willing to execute the
contract as written.
A few years later another New York attorney, Charles Jurrist,developed a
contract based loosely on the Projansky Agreement. It was simpler and more
practicable, and achieved many of the results to which the Projansky contract
was addressed. The-Jurrist contract sought a more modest package of rights
for the artist, and provided safeguards for the collector in an effort to make the
contract more palatable to him. Unlike the Projansky contract, the Jurrist
agreement sought to obtain a fifteen percent royalty for the artist only on the
first resale of the work. This eliminated the very complicated system of
ongoing contracts and did not unduly restrict transferability.
Under the Projansky agreement the collector could only sell to a purchaser
who himself would enter into a Projansky agreement with the artist. Despite
its less restrictive provisions, the Jurrist agreement was no more successful in
this respect. Most artists who tried to use the agreements had to forego sales
or take out the reserved rights clause, though some of the other goals relating
to care and exhibition rights were often achieved. The problem with both
contractual arrangements was that they did not reflect the power realitites of
the art world. The economics of the art marketplace are such that only those
artists who can make their own market, like Robert Rauschenberg, can use
such contracts successfully.
The California Resale Royalties Act provides for a five percent royalty of
the gross resale price when the work has a fair market value of at least $1,000,
is sold at a profit, and either the seller of the work resides in or the sale takes
place in California. The royalty cannot be transferred, and can only be
49 Ricklefs, Artists Decide They Should Share Profits on Resale of Paintings, Wall. St. J. Feb.
11, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
50 Under the contract, the artist received a guarantee that the work would remain unaltered by
the owner. The artist had the right to be notified if the work were to be exhibited, the right to
show the work for two months every five years at no cost to the owner, the right to be consulted if
restoration became necessary, one half of any rental income paid for the work, and all
reproduction rights. Benefits from the appreciated resale value would accrue to the owner for
his lifetime plus the life of his surviving spouse plus twenty-one years. If the owner died, the heirs
would pay 15 percent of the difference between the fair market value of the work at the time of
the transfer to them and the price paid for it by the deceased, assuming the current market value
was greater. If the work was destroyed by fire, the artist would receive 15 percent of the
insurance.
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waived by a written agreement providing for a royalty in excess of five
percent of the gross resale price.
5
'
It is the responsibility of the seller or his agent to locate and pay the artist, 52
and if the artist is not located and paid within ninety days the resale royalty is
to be transferred to the California Arts Council, which is to place the funds in
an escrow account and attempt to locate the artist. 53 If the artist is not found
within seven years, the money is to be transferred to the Council's operating
fund.54
If the seller or his agent fails to pay the royalty, the artist may bring an
action for damages against the seller within three years after the date of the
sale or one year after the discovery of the resale, whichever is later.5 5 The
statute does not apply to the initial sale or to resale after the death of the artist.
Nor does it apply to resale where the gross sales price is less than the purchase
price paid by the seller. The statute only applies to fine arts - original
paintings, works of sculpture, or drawings5 6 - and thus prints and works
produced by other multiple reproduction techniques are not included.
The statute has been upheld by a California district court.5 7 Congressman
Henry A. Waxman has introduced a bill to establish resale royalties on a
federal level.5 8  Federal legislation is the only promising approach to a
success. The problem with all artists' reserved rights legislation is that it tends
to help only those that can help themselves, and fails to benefit the over-
whelming number of poor artists for whom a resale market is a dream which
appears only after the more pressing need of selling to any purchaser is
achieved. Nonetheless, reserved rights legislation has served a useful role in
rallying artists to general questions relating to artists' rights.
D. Droit Moral
Until 1977 American law had not recognized that artists might have a
moral or personal right in their work which transcended or outlasted their
ownership right. The droit moral, or moral right of the artist, is a concept in
French and European law which legally recognizes that a "moral right" or
integrity remains to the creator of the work even after the work is sold. In the
law of France and other Western European countries, artistic rights involve
not only a property right and copyright, but a second element - a moral or
nonproperty attribute of intellectual and moral character which gives legal
expression to an intimate bond existing between an artistic work and the
author. 59 The moral right of the author is considered a right of personalty as
51 CAL. CIv. CODE § 986(a) (West 1977).
52 Id. § 986(a)(2)(4).
53 Id. § 986(a)(2)(5).
4 Id. § 986(a)(5).
55 Id. § 986(a)(3).
56 Id. § 986(c)(2).
51 Morseburg v. Balyon, No. CV24-7210RMT (C.D. Cal. March 23, 1978).
8 H.R. 11403 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
59 Sarraute, Current Theory of the Moral Rights of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16
AM. J. COMP. L. 465 (1968).
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opposed to a property right.6" This ongoing non-economic right or interest
remains even after the artist has sold the work and no longer retains possession
or ownership of the specific object.6 1
There has as yet been no judicial recognition of the artist's moral right in
the United States. If the owner of an important sculpture by Mark diSuvero
should go mad, pull out his blow torch, and melt his diSuvero into a
nondescript lump, there is little that anyone could do. Absent a specific
clause in the contract of sale, diSuvero would be powerless.1
2
One of the few attempts to obtain judicial recognition of the droit moral
failed.63 In Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, Alfred D. Crimi had been
commissioned to create a fresco in a church. After completion some of the
parishioners objected to the mural, feeling that Crimi's portrayal of Christ
with so much of his chest bare placed more emphasis on his physical attributes
than his spiritual qualities. In 1947, eight years after its completion, the mural
was painted over. Crimi brought suit to compel the congregation to have the
frescoes restored or removed and to pay damages. The court held that no
rights, moral or otherwise, were reserved to the artist, and that if the artist had
wanted to reserve such rights, he would have to do so by contract.
6 4
In 1977, the first legislative recognition of the artist's moral right occurred
under the California Art and Public Buildings Act, a "percent for art statute"
which requires the state architect in consultation with the California Arts
Council to purchase commissioned works of art for placement in state
buildings.65 The statute specifically requires the state architect to respect the
moral rights of every artist whose work is purchased or commissioned. The
state architect must "insure that every work of art . . . is properly main-
tained and is not artistically altered in any manner without the consent of the
artist."6  The artist retains the following intangible rights:
(1) the right to claim authorship of the work of art.
(2) the right to reproduce such works of art including all rights to
which the work of art may be subject under copyright laws.
(3) if provided by written contract, the right to receive a specified
percentage of the proceeds if the work of art is subsequently sold by
the state to a third party .... 67
60 Merrymen, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGs L. J. 1023, 1025 (1976).
"I Professor Merryman has termed the droit moral a composite right which includes: the right
to respect a work of art, that is, the right of integrity which consists of the right to respect the work
of art as it was created by the artist; the right of paternity, which is the right of the artist to insist
that his work be associated with his name; and the right of divulgation, that is, the artist's right to
withhold his work which relates to the artist's absolute right to decide when a work of art is
complete and when to show it to the public. Id. at 1027.
62 The result might be different if the work was located in a museum and the destruction was
attempted by the museum. A museum has a different relationship to the public and is regulated
by the state attorney general. For instance, N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 264 (McKinney 1976) makes
vandalism of art works in museums a criminal act. Di Suvero might have a tort remedy if the mad
collector attempted to resell or exhibit the work. See S. FELDMAN & S. WEIL, supra note 2, at 15-
17.1 Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570,89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
64 Id. at 576-77, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
65 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 15813 (West 1977). See Sandison, California Enact Droit Moral and
Droit de Suite, ART & THE LAW, Mar.-Apr. 1977, at 3.
66 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15813.3(e) (West 1977).
67 Id, § 15813 .5(a).
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These rights can be extended to the artist's heirs by written contract for
twenty years following the artist's death.68 In what one commentator has
referred to as the first appearance of a Miranda69 rule for artists' rights the
artist must be informed "in writing of all the rights specified which may be
granted to the artist or to the artist's heirs."70
Though new to American jurisprudence, the California statute may serve
as a prelude to similar legislation on the federal and state levels, as evidenced
by the droit moral bill recently introduced by Congressman Drinan in the
House of Representatives as an amendment to the Copyright Act.
7
'
E. Copyright and the Visual Artist
Visual artists have generally been reluctant to avail themselves of copy-
right protection for their work. Many artists feel that the copyright notice is
an intrusion upon their artistic statement, a defacement of their work, and an
excessive capitulation to the marketplace.72 Of more economic significance
is that many dealers and collectors are reluctant to purchase works of art
bearing a copyright notice.7 3
The consequences of the failure to copyright artworks can be disastrous to
the artist. Millions of dollars were made on Robert Indiana's design of
LOVE, but the artist received not one cent from commercial exploitation due
to his failure to copyright the work.7 1
Aside from artistic reluctance to utilize the copyright notice, copyright
principles are not fundamentally applicable to the visual arts for they are
based upon usage for multiples. The value of a work of art is in its singularity,
while the value of a song or a book is that it is created to be reproduced.
Unlike most books, musical works, motion pictures, sound recordings, and
dramatic, pantomime, and choreographic works, the initial value of a work of
art usually inures in the master work or original, rather than in its reproductive
potential. 75 For monumental sculptures, the original is the final commercial
outlet for exploiting the artistic notion. For other classes of copyrightable
subject matter, the economic motivation for creating the work is eventual
repetition or reproduction, and not merely a single sale of a single copy of the
underlying work.7 6
The visual artist has done fairly well under the Copyright Act of 1976,
which for the first time at least implicitly recognizes the distinction between
68 Id. § 15813.5(b).
69 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10 Sandison, supra note 65, at 4; CAL. GOv'T CODE § 15813.5(c) (West 1977).
71 H.R. 8261 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
7' Brenner, A Two-Phase Approach to Copyrighting the Fine Arts, 24 BULL. CoPYIUCr Soc'Y
85,102(1976). In most European countries there is no notice requirement.
71 In a survey to determine why visual artists did not use the statutory copyright, the
researcher questioned 45 gallery owners; 57.7% of the galleries surveyed felt that the copyright
notice defaced an art work, and that the uniqueness of the show would be diluted by the
suggestion implied by the notice that the works were not necessarily one of a kind. Sheehan,
Why Don't Fine Artists Use Statutory Copyright?, 22 BULL. CoPYmiCH Soc'y 242, 257 (1975).
11 Indiana now regularly copyrights his work.
15 Brenner, supra note 72, at 86.
76 Id. at 87.
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works of fine art and other subjects of copyright, and provides an escape valve
from the copyright notice.7 7 Under Section 101, the term "copies" includes
the original or master in which the work is first affixed. Thus, in the context of
the copyright law an original work of art comes under the definition of
"copies." However, a sale of original or a small number of copies to the
public without notice does not invalidate the copyrights of such works,78 and
the copyright owner need not take any corrective action to validate the
copyright involved.7 9
The sale of an original graphic or sculptural work without copyright notice
will not automatically divest the artist of his copyright. The duty to affix
notice will arise when the work of art becomes a source for reproduction."0
Thus, the duty to affix notice will arise from multiple run reproductions, but
not for very limited editions of "relatively small" number. Under Section
405(a) (2) the artist must register the work within five years after publication
without notice. The artist must then make a "reasonable effort" to add the
notice to all copies which have been distributed to the public after the
omission has been discovered.
For the artist who does place a copyright notice on his work, the
requirements are stricter. Under prior law, the absence of the year of date of
first publication in a copyright notice was acceptable.' The new Act
provides that the date must be present in the copyright notice if one is used.
Under proposed regulations recently published by the Registrar, there is
no longer any excuse for artists not to use the copyright notice. Notice may
be placed directly or by means of a label that is cemented, sewn or otherwise
properly secured, or it can be placed on the backing, mounting, framing, or
other material to which the work is attached. For three-dimensional works,
notice can be placed directly on or by means of a label cemented, sewn or
otherwise permanently secured to any visible portion of the three-
dimensional work or to any base, mounting, framing or other material to
which the work is attached. If the work is of a physical nature that does not
lend itself to the notice being written directly on the work or written on a
label, the notice may appear on a durable tag attached to the copy with
sufficient permanency that it will remain with the copy during the entire time
of the work.82
Other sections of the copyright revision recognize certain problems and
needs of the visual arts. For the first time in history, applied arts and works of
artistic craftsmanship are given statutory recognition as the subject matter of
copyright.13 The originality requirement could cause a problem for artists.
77 See generally Gottlieb & Nolen, Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural Works Under the New
Act, in 1 PLI, CuRrNr DEVELOPMENTS IN CoPYIrr LAw 501 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Got-
tlieb & Nolan].
7' Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 405(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
79 Gottlieb & Nolan, supra note 77, at 512; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147
(1976) [hereinafter cited HOUSE REPORT].
80 Brenner, supra note 72, at 113.
S Gottlieb & Nolan, supra note 77, at511; 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1970); Fleischer Studios Inc. v. Ralph
A. Freundlich Inc., 73 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1934).
82 42 Fed. Reg. 64374 (1977), to be codified in 37 C.F.R. § 201.2(i).
83 Id. § 101.
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Section 101 makes a distinction between designs that can at least conceptual-
ly be identified separately and exist independently from utilitarian aspects of
the useful article in which they are embodied, and those designs which
cannot. Only the former are copyrightable.14 The House Report would not
allow copyright for shapes of automobiles, airplanes, or food processors.8,
Thus, an artist who took an automobile tire and placed his name on the rim of
the tire with a copyright notice and the year of publication - clearly a
possibility these days - would probably not be granted copyright protection.
Of special importance is the resolution of the long-time controversy over
whether a display of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works in a gallery
exhibition should be considered "publication." The new law specifically
states that the public display of a work at a gallery is not a publication.8 6
One area in which visual artists made their presence known concerns the
strict depository requirements of two complete copies of the best edition.
Each copy of a small edition of a graphic work may have a substantial
economic value, and to require artists to deposit two copies imposes a very
difficult burden. With the visual artist specifically in mind, the statute
provides that the Register of Copyrights may issue regulations to exempt any
categories of material from the depository requirement, or to provide
alternative forms of deposit.87 Regulations recently promulgated under this
authority permit a deposit of photographs for any work in an edition of no
more than 300. Visual artists have also benefitted in that the transfer of
ownership of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work does not convey rights of
reproduction in the absence of a written agreement.88
Overall, the visual artist's needs have been recognized in the recent
revision of the copyright law. From a theoretical perspective, however,
original art works do not fit properly into copyright categories, and copyright
remains primarily a legal device to protect reproductive rights. One hopes
that the subtle recognition in the revision that an original work of art will not
lose copyright protection if it does not have the notice affixed will eventually
" Gottlieb & Nolan, supra note 77, at 509; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 79, at 55, in which it is
stated that "unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television
set, or any other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be
copyrighted under the bill."
8' HOUSE REPORT, supra note 79, at 58.
'8 Copyright Act of 1976,17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1977); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 79,
at 63-64.
87 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 407(c) (West Supp. 1977). This section also states
that:
[s]uch regulations shall provide either for complete exemption from the deposit
requirements of this'section, or for alternative forms of deposit aimed at providing a
satisfactory archival record of a work without imposing practical or financial hardships
on the depositor, where the individual author is the owner of copyright in a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work and (i) less than five copies of the work have been published,
or (ii) the work has been published in a limited edition consisting of numbered copies,
the monetary value of which would make the mandatory deposit of two copies of the
best edition of the work burdensome, unfair, or unreasonable.
8 Id. §§ 202, 204(a). These sections overrule Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc'y, Inc., 287
N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942). Several states had reached the results codified in sections 202 and
204(a). See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 224 (McKinney 1968); CAL.. CIV CODE § 9 82 (c) (West
Supp. 1977).
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become an explicit statutory recognition that art works are exempt from the
statutory formalities of copyright until such time as the work is to be repro-
duced.
IV. LESS DEVELOPED AREAS: FEDERAL TAXATION
As illustrated in the above discussion of copyright, many areas of law have
not yet begun to respond to the particularized needs of the visual artist, and by
subsuming the visual arts under more general rules a sometimes uncomforta-
ble fit has been forced. The area of federal income taxation has been
problematic for the visual artist because of the failure by Congress and the
Internal Revenue Service to recognize special needs of the arts. There are
dire consequences to the artist, particularly the poor artist, in the ignoring of
these needs.
A. The Home Office Deduction
The tightening of the home office deduction under the Tax Reform Act of
1976 has created real problems for the visual artist.89 Under the new
provisions, a deduction may be taken for the maintenance of a home office if:
(i) it is the principal place of business; (ii) it is used exclusively as a place of
business by the taxpayer in meeting or dealing with patients, clients, or
customers in the normal course of business; (iii) it is used for storage of
inventory which the taxpayer sells at retail or wholesale in the normal course
of business, but only if the residence is the taxpayer's only fixed place of
business; or (iv) if the home office is a separate structure not attached to the
dwelling unit in which the taxpayer resides, used exclusively "in connection
with" the taxpayer's business, and any portion of the residence is rented to
someone else.90
Under these new provisions an artist may deduct his or her rent or
maintenance allocable to space in the apartment or loft which is exclusively
used as artists' principal art studio. Unlike the old law, there is no mixed or
allocated use of an artist's studio. That is, the artist can no longer use a studio
area for both living and working purposes. This means the artist must
rigorously delimit space for the exclusive use of his artistic activities.
Congress apparently did not intend to harm the artist through this
tightening of the deduction. The Committee Report discussing the provision
that a separate structure not attached to the dwelling may be used for the
home office deduction cited as the only example of a separate structure "an
artist's studio in a structure adjacent to but unattached to his residence."'"
This is of benefit to suburban or rural artists who have converted barns into
studios, but does not reflect the urban reality of artists who live and work in
large, single-roomed lofts.
Of greater difficulty to the poor artist is that the annual business deduction
for the business portion of the residence may not exceed the annual gross
89 I.R.C. § 280A.
9o Id.
9' S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 148, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3439, 3580.
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income from the business minus the non-business deductions - that is, those
available without regard to business activity.92 This means that if an artist
sells no paintings in a particular year, he can no longer make use of the home
office deduction. One cannot have a loss resulting from the use of a studio.
This has a particularly severe result for the average artist who has an
intermittant market. Studio expenses are ongoing, and there may be years
when no paintings are sold. Louise Nevelson, for instance, did not sell a
single piece of art until she was fifty-six years old, though she presented her
first one-woman show at the age of forty-one.9" In this respect, the home
office restriction simply does not take into account the realities of the art
market.
B. Artists' Charitable Contributions
The Tax Reform Act of 196994 excluded from the definition of capital
asset, and therefore from the tax advantages of capital gains treatment,
copyright interests and literary, musical, or artistic compositions, as well as
letters, memoranda, or similar property when in the hands of the taxpayer
whose personal efforts created the property.9 5 If an artist donates one of his
works to a tax exempt institution, the allowable deduction is computed by
reducing the fair market value of the work by the amount of appreciation of
such property. Thus, the artist may deduct from adjusted gross income only
the cost of materials he utilized to create the work. However, the collector or
one who has obtained the work of art from the creator who has contributed
the same work to a non-profit institution may treat the work as a capital asset,
and therefore deduct a portion of the fair market value of the work from his
adjusted gross income. 9
The result of this change in the tax laws is that artists have substantially
reduced their donations to museums. In response, legislation was introduced
in 1976 to enable the artist under specified circumstances to deduct from his
adjusted gross income seventy-five percent of the fair market value of his
work which he contributes to nonprofit institutions. 97 The artist could have
deducted in any one year a maximum of $25,000, but the deduction could not
exceed the taxpayer's gross income for such year from the sale of art work.
The bill died in conference.
Similar bills have been introduced in the current session which would
allow the artist to receive a tax credit for the contribution of art works. 98 The
Treasury opposes these bills on the ground that artists are providing services
in such circumstances which for other groups are generally non-deductible.
The Treasury feels that the lost donations will eventually come from artists'
92 I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5).
93 Conroy, Form and Function, Washington Post, Feb. 20, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
94 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of
I.R.C.).
95 I.R.C. § 1221.
96 Id. § 170.
97 S. 1435, 94tb Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The corresponding House Bill was H.R. 6057.
"'IS. 1384, 95th Cong., lstSess. (1977); H.R. 439,95thCong., lstSess. (1977). Thebillwould
provide a tax credit of 30 percent of the fair market value of contributions to $35,000.
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estates, and that there is justification for giving preferred treatment to
collectors because they had paid for the works initially. 9
C. Estate Tax: Carryover Basis
The reform of the laws governing estate taxation has, perhaps unintention-
ally, caused problems for artists' estates. Under prior law, artists' heirs
received capital gains treatment for profits received by them from the sale of
inherited art works that were in excess of fair market value at the date of
death. 00 Under the new law, the heirs are taxed at ordinary rather than
capital gains rates on the difference between the original cost of the art work
to the decedent and the sale price received by the artist's heirs. This new
basis is due to the interplay of section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which excludes from the definition of capital asset an artistic composition by
one who created the property,' 0' and a new carryover basis rule for property
acquired or passing from a decedent, which provides that the inheritor of
property will take the same basis in property for determining gain or loss as
the decedent had immediately before death, subject to certain adjustments. 10 2
Because of the carryover, a gain realized by the sale of art work by the artist's
estate will be treated as ordinary income. 0 3
These and similar problems result in part from a move toward simplifica-
tion and reform in the system of federal estate taxation, at a time when artists
are seeking special assistance in meeting their specialized needs. As in other
areas of taxation, the affluent artist can often utilize the tax laws to some
benefit; the poor artist cannot.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed but a few areas of the law in which special
approaches to the specific needs of the arts have been developed, and others,
such as federal income taxation, in which these needs have been ignored. Art
law is a developing legal specialty. Its parameters are not yet fixed. While
in many respects the law and the legal community are not yet fully responsive
to the particularized needs of the artist, it is clear that the process of
refinement and accomodation of legal thought in this area will continue.
" Art and Taxes on the Menu at Mrs. Mondale's Luncheon, N.Y. Times, June 2,1977, at 16, col.
3.
100 Gorewitz, Effect of 1976 Tax Reform Act on Artists' Estate and Gift Taxes, ART & THE
LAW, Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 5.
101 I.R.C. § 1221.
102 I.R.C. § 1023.
103 Gorewitz, supra note 100, at 6.
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